Category: Spooks
Imam Aulaqi and Yemen's image problem (Updated)
![]()
Anwar al-Aulaqi’s website and his statement praising the suspected Fort Hood shooter as a “hero” has vanished from the Internet. (For those who are interested, the statement in its entirety can be found at the end of this post.)
The words of the former San Diego imam — now said to be living hiding in Yemen — have received wide distribution. The timing of his Nov. 8 statement of support for Maj. Nidal Hasan, however, has escaped notice.
While Aulaqi’s name and his links to Maj. Hasan were being leaked to the Western press, U.S. military officials were quietly holding two days of talks on terrorism and other issues with their counterparts in Yemen, according to Saba, Yemen’s official state news agency.
Brig. Gen. Jefforey A. Smith, recently named deputy director for politico-military affairs in the Middle East (J5) for the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, signed a joint cooperation agreement today, confirming U.S. support for Yemen’s shaky government.
Update: The US embassy declined to comment on whether an agreement had been signed, but tells AFP that talks involving Smith had taken place and said they focused on counterterrorism efforts against groups operating in Yemen. (The AFP misidentified Smith.)
This week’s talks in Sana’a have attracted no attention in the United States. But Yemen’s Chief of the General Staff Ahmed al-Ashwal said the talks were of great concern to the government of President Ali Abdullah Salih, which is battling al-Qaida in the east and tribal rebels in the north backed by Iran.
The Economist reported this week:
Yemen’s increasing lawlessness outside shrinking zones of state control around the main cities is one reason why, earlier this year, al-Qaeda’s Saudi branch announced it was moving across the border and merging forces with its brethren in Yemen. The joint operation, calling itself “al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula”, known in intelligence circles as AQAP, has carried out sporadic attacks inside Yemen, where tacit agreements with the government appear to have broken down. But its main target still appears to be Saudi Arabia.
The most recent State Department report on terrorism described Yemen’s efforts as “mixed.” While it took action against al-Qaida, Yemen, despite pressure from the U.S., continued a surrender program for terrorists it could not apprehend and released all returned Guantanamo detainees.
All of which makes the timing of Aulaqi’s statement even more interesting:
Nidal Hassan Did The Right Thing
Nidal Hassan is a hero.
He is a man of conscience who could not bear living the contradiction of being a Muslim and serving in an army that is fighting against his own people. This is a contradiction that many Muslims brush aside and just pretend that it doesn’t exist. Any decent Muslim cannot live, understanding properly his duties towards his Creator and his fellow Muslims, and yet serve as a US soldier. The US is leading the war against terrorism which in reality is a war against Islam. Its army is directly invading two Muslim countries and indirectly occupying the rest through its stooges.
Nidal opened fire on soldiers who were on their way to be deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. How can there be any dispute about the virtue of what he has done? In fact the only way a Muslim could Islamically justify serving as a soldier in the US army is if his intention is to follow the footsteps of men like Nidal.
The heroic act of brother Nidal also shows the dilemma of the Muslim American community. Increasingly they are being cornered into taking stances that would either make them betray Islam or betray their nation. Many amongst them are choosing the former. The Muslim organizations in America came out in a pitiful chorus condemning Nidal’s operation.
The fact that fighting against the US army is an Islamic duty today cannot be disputed. No scholar with a grain of Islamic knowledge can defy the clear cut proofs that Muslims today have the right — rather the duty — to fight against American tyranny. Nidal has killed soldiers who were about to be deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan in order to kill Muslims. The American Muslims who condemned his actions have committed treason against the Muslim Ummah and have fallen into hypocrisy.
Allah(swt) says: Give tidings to the hypocrites that there is for them a painful punishment – Those who take disbelievers as allies instead of the believers. Do they seek with them honor [through power]? But indeed, honor belongs to Allah entirely. (al-Nisa 136-137)
The inconsistency of being a Muslim today and living in America and the West in general reveals the wisdom behind the opinions that call for migration from the West. It is becoming more and more difficult to hold on to Islam in an environment that is becoming more hostile towards Muslims.
May Allah grant our brother Nidal patience, perseverance and steadfastness and we ask Allah to accept from him his great heroic act. Ameen.
Fort Hood and the San Diego 9/11 hijacking connection (Updated)
Investigators are examining connections between the suspected Fort Hood shooter and an imam named Anwar Aulaqi.
On his blog yesterday (yes, his blog), Aulaqi called Maj. Nadal Hasan “a hero.”
Nidal opened fire on soldiers who were on their way to be deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. How can there be any dispute about the virtue of what he has done? In fact the only way a Muslim could Islamically justify serving as a soldier in the US army is if his intention is to follow the footsteps of men like Nidal.
The heroic act of brother Nidal also shows the dilemma of the Muslim American community. Increasingly they are being cornered into taking stances that would either make them betray Islam or betray their nation. Many amongst them are choosing the former. The Muslim organizations in America came out in a pitiful chorus condemning Nidal’s operation.
The man who calls on fellow Muslim soldiers to kill their brothers in arms is a U.S. citizen who broadcasts his message of jihad (in English) from Yemen where he has lived since 2004. He not only has a website, but can be found on Facebook.
Before Yemen, Aulaqi had preached in Denver, San Diego, and Falls Church, Virginia.
It was in Virginia that Aulaqi may have met “brother Nidal.” Hasan attended a mosque in Falls Church in 2001 where Aulaqi was serving as imam, according to The Washington Post. Update: The Dar Al Hijrah mosque says Aulaqi was employed there from January 2001 through April 2002.
Also attending the Falls Church mosque were two Sept. 11 hijackers, Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid Almidhar.
According to the Sept. 11 Commission’s report, the two hijackers “reportedly respected Aulaqi as a religious figure and developed a close relationship with him.”
Before moving to Virginia, Aulaqi was imam at the Rabat mosque in San Diego until mid-2000. The two hijackers also attended the Rabat mosque. They may even have met or at least talked to Aulaqi on their first day in San Diego.
According to his online biography, Aulaqi received a master’s degree in educational leadership from San Diego State University.
Aulaqi had connections to others of interest to the San Diego FBI, including Mohdar Abdullah (see my earlier post) and Omar al Bayoumi, a man believed to be a Saudi agent who helped the hijackers settle in San Diego.
From a footnote in the Sept. 11 Commission report:
The FBI investigated Aulaqi in 1999 and 2000 after learning that he may have been contacted by a possible procurement agent for Bin Ladin. During the investigation, the FBI learned that Aulaqi knew individuals from the Holy Land Foundation and others involved in raising money for the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas. Sources alleged that Aulaqi had other extremist connections.
None of this information was considered strong enough to support a criminal prosecution.
The Congressional Joint Inquiry on 9/11 notes that Aulaqi was visited by a “subject of a Los Angeles investigation closely associated with Blind Sheikh [Omar Abdel] Rahman,” who was convicted in a 1993 New York City bomb plot.
In mid-2006, Aulaqi was arrested in Yemen and spent 18 months behind bars, almost all of it in solitary confinement. In this interview with a former Guantanamo detainee, Aulaqi says he was held at the request of the U.S. government and was interviewed in custody by FBI agents.
Update: TPM Muckracker’s Justin Elliott has a comprehensive post on Nidal, including The New York Times report that “intelligence agencies” intercepted 10 to 20 communications last year and this year between Aulaqi and Hasan. The messages reportedly did not suggest any threat of violence.
Homeland Security Undersecretary for Intelligence Charles E. Allen last year described Aulaqi as an al-Qaida supporter and a former “spiritual leader” to three of the Sept. 11 hijackers.
And finally, judging from these recent comments on his website here, here and here, Aulaqi is deeply missed in San Diego.
Second Update: The Falls Church, Virginia mosque where Aulaqi served as imam has openly denounced his statement of praise for Hasan:
During Mr. Al-Awlaki’s short employment at our center, his public speech was consistent with the values of tolerance and cooperation. After returning to Yemen, Mr. Awlaki now claims that the American Muslims who have condemned the violent acts of Major Hasan have committed treason against the Muslim Umaah [community] and have fallen into hypocrisy. With this reversal, Mr. Al-Awlaki has clearly set himself apart from Muslims in America.
How defense giant SAIC made $3.5b in 5 years
In the Hall of Fame of missed business opportunities, a special place is reserved for Emmit McHenry.
In 1995, McHenry sold his small company called Network Solutions for $4.7 million to the secretive and powerful San Diego defense giant SAIC.
Five years later, McHenry’s business sold again for $3.5 billion.
Network Solutions (known today as VeriSign) administers a database of 90 million domain names that includes all the dot-coms on the Internet (including this one). This database told your computer where to find the page you are now reading. Without it, there would be no Internet as we know it. No Google. No Amazon.
If you haven’t heard the full story of SAIC and Network Solutions it’s because the full story hasn’t really been told before. SAIC hasn’t exactly tooted its own horn on the whole the Network Solutions saga. Many were outraged that the government had granted the employee-owned company what amounted to a license to print money.
In this 2-part piece by my friend Bruce Bigelow at Xconomy, a local San Diego business website that I have done some work for in the past, got SAIC founder Robert Beyster to tell the story.
In SAIC’s hands, McHenry’s small company turned out to be “unbelievably profitable,” says Robert Beyster, the scientist who founded and ran SAIC until his ouster from the company in 2004. In fact, thanks to Network Solutions, SAIC may have been making too much money:
X: Why did SAIC decide to do the partial IPO in 1997? Did that turn out to be a smart thing to do? SAIC sold 3.3 million common shares, or a 21 percent-stake in Network Solutions, raising more than $59 million. SAIC retained almost 12 million shares of the stock, which carried preferential rights that basically preserved 96 percent control of the company.
JRB: The value of NSI was becoming so great that we wanted to take some of the profits we had made off the table in case of difficulties later on. (emphasis added)
There were — and still are — many people who think this never should have been allowed. The Internet had its origins in a network created by a research unit at the Pentagon and thus belonged to no one. The National Science Foundation oversaw the domain name registration database, a job that it contracted out to Network Solutions.
If McHenry didn’t realize what he had, SAIC sure did. A few months after SAIC acquired the company, the government amended the terms of Network Solutions’ contract. The amendment allowed SAIC to charge $100 to register a domain name (subsequently lowered). Equally important, the contract amendment allowed SAIC to keep 70 percent of the revenue, and gave the company a monopoly over the business.
This monopoly began to rub people the wrong way, and a spate of lawsuits were filed. So SAIC turned to its friends in Washington, says Mitch Daniels, who engineered the Network Solutions deal:
MD: We spent significant amounts of time and money at NSI educating the public, Congress, and senior government officials about aspects of the business that were really important: the Internet, domain names, Internet security, major policy questions involved with domain names, and keeping the “A” server and the other domain names servers running and secure. From 1995 until 2000, we brought at least one-half of the entire United States Senate and House members as well as senior White House and cabinet-level officials to tour our facilities in Herndon, VA.
Even if McHenry had hung on to the company, he would have been unable to marshal the kind of firepower that SAIC had in Washington. After a court held that Network Solutions was assessing an illegal tax, Congress in 1998 slipped language into an appropriations bill that retroactively made this “fee” legal. (See Thomas v. Network Solutions.) One of SAIC’s lobbyists in 1998, incidentally, was the ethically challenged former San Diego congressman Bill Lowery.
Last month, SAIC moved its headquarters to McLean, Va. At last report, it had annual revenues of more than $10 billion.
As for McHenry, he’s moved on and tries not to dwell on what could have been.
CIA Lawyers and the "Legal Principles" memo
This month’s issue of The American Lawyer includes a piece I wrote on the CIA’s Office of General Counsel. Click here to read it (.pdf).
An interesting legal issue that I didn’t mention in the piece involves a document released to the ACLU in August titled “Legal Principles Applicable to CIA Detention and Interrogation of Captured al-Qa’ida Personnel.”(.pdf)
It was written by unnamed CIA attorneys with help from John Yoo, the attorney in the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel. The OLC provides authoritative legal advice to the Executive Branch, and Yoo authored a whole bunch of controversial opinions dealing with torture and wiretapping and who knows what else that were later rescinded.
The “Legal Principles” was drafted in the spring of 2003. Why it was drafted isn’t clear. A few months earlier, Yoo had given the CIA specific advice on the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, (.pdf) whom President Bush called one of the top three leaders in al-Qaida.
The key difference between the classified Yoo memo and the CIA’s “Legal Principles” is that the latter broadened the application of “enhanced” interrogation, including the waterboard, to apply to anyone connected with the terrorist group.
The “Legal Principles” memo also set no limits on the number of times that the waterboard could be applied, and it added new techniques such as diapering to the list of approved interrogation techniques previously authorized.
Thus the document provided the legal cover needed for aggressive interrogation of all al-Qaida personnel, not just one.
Or did it?
Whether or not the Justice Department formally approved the “Legal Principles” and with it, the expansion of the CIA’s interrogation program, is now a matter of dispute.
The Office of Legal Counsel at the Justice Department said the undated and unsigned bullet points do not constitute a formal opinion, and that this position was made clear to the CIA.
According to the CIA’s Office of General Counsel, the “Legal Principles” memo “embodies DoJ agreement” that the Justice Department’s opinion “extends beyond” the interrogation of a single detainee. The agency also cited a National Security Council meeting in July 2003, during which Attorney General John Ashcroft approved use of multiple applications of the waterboard on other detainees.
Even with Ashcroft’s verbal assent, it became clear that the CIA was legally on shaky ground without a formal opinion.
In a review of the interrogation program, CIA Inspector General John Helgerson apparently recommended that CIA lawyers seek a formal opinion from the Justice Department confirming the conclusions outlined in the bullet points.
In March 2004, CIA General Counsel wrote Jack Goldsmith, head of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, and asked him to “reaffirm” these “Legal Principles.” Goldsmith declined to do so.
The debate over the “Legal Principles” memo isn’t merely academic. The question of who authorized what is a critical one, especially as a federal prosecutor is reviewing the interrogation program to see whether crimes may have been committed.
As human rights lawyer John Sifton asked, “Without formal authorization, how can anyone involved in the subsequent authorization assert that their actions were legally authorized?”
The “Legal Principles” memo may be the most overlooked document in the whole torture debate.
The Strange Case of Mohdar Abdullah
Did the U.S. government consider designating San Diego college student Mohdar Abdullah (left) as an enemy combatant after the 9/11 attacks?
The suggestion appears in one of several 9/11 Commission memoranda that were recently released by the National Archives and that make it clear that U.S. authorities viewed Abdullah as a major threat. An enemy combatant designation would have allowed President Bush to order Abdullah detained indefinitely in Guantanamo or military brig.
Ten days after the attacks, Abdullah was arrested as a material witness to the 9/11 attacks and shipped off to New York. Prosecutors there considered charging him along with Zacarias Moussaoui, who is serving life in prison for conspiring to kill Americans in the 9/11 attacks but ultimately decided not to.
Commission documents show that Abdullah presented a dilemma for the government, which believed that he knew much more about the attacks than he would admit, but lacked sufficient evidence to support a terrorism charge. Abdullah was charged with visa fraud and deported to Yemen in 2004.
“If anyone in San Diego had prior knowledge of the 9/11 attacks it would be Abdullah,” one unnamed FBI agent told the Commission.
Abdullah had befriended the two hijackers when they lived in San Diego in 2000 and admitted helping the two men obtain state identification, contacting flight schools on their behalf and translating for them. Abdullah knew the pair had extremist leanings and sympathized with them, according to the 9/11 Commission’s final report. After Hazmi after he left San Diego, he remained in contact with Hazmi.
For three weeks before the attacks, Abdullah had been acting strangely. Several witnesses described him as nervous, paranoid and anxious. He stopped using the phone and didn’t show up at work or school.
On the morning of Sept. 10 at the Texaco station where Abdullah worked, an FBI source reporting hearing Abdullah saying something like, “It’s finally going to happen.” That night, Abdullah wanted to marry a young woman he had met a few months earlier, according to FBI Special Agent Daniel Gonzales.
Much later, Abdullah’s fellow inmates told the FBI that he had bragged to them of advance knowledge of the attacks, but authorities couldn’t substantiate the reports.
Abdullah denied foreknowledge of the attacks.
Gonzales described Abdullah as “a ‘slick’ and charismatic ‘liar.’” The unnamed San Diego FBI agent described Abdullah as a “goofball” and didn’t think he was a willing facilitator for the hijackers.
In their efforts to deport Abdullah, U.S. authorities were “running against the clock,” Justice Department officials told 9/11 Commission staffers in 2004.
Exactly what this means is unclear. The full explanation remains classified, but there’s no doubt that authorities didn’t want to let Abdullah go.
“The fear was a worst-case scenario where the opportunity to deport disappears, criminal charges do not materialize, and Abdullah succeeds in his habeas petition and is walking the streets,” Jonathan Cohn of the Justice Department told Commission staffers.
